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Abstract 
This research examines the role of different forms of positive regard for the in-group 
in predicting beliefs in intergroup conspiracies. Collective narcissism reflects a belief in in-
group greatness contingent on RWKHUV¶ recognition. We hypothesized that collective 
narcissism should be especially likely to foster out-group conspiracy beliefs. Positive yet 
non-narcissistic in-group positivity should predict a weaker tendency to believe in conspiracy 
theories. In Study 1 the endorsement of conspiratorial explanations of out-group actions was 
positively predicted by collective narcissism but negatively by non-narcissistic in-group 
positivity. Study 2 showed that the opposite effects of collective narcissism and non-
narcissistic in-group positivity on conspiracy beliefs were mediated via differential 
perceptions of threat. Study 3 manipulated whether conspiracy theories implicated in-group 
or out-group members. Collective narcissism predicted belief in out-group conspiracies but 
not in-group conspiracies, while non-narcissistic in-group positivity predicted lower 
conspiracy beliefs, regardless of them being ascribed to the in-group or the out-group. 
Keywords: conspiracy beliefs, collective narcissism, in-group identification, threat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RUNNING HEAD: In-group positivity and intergroup conspiracies                                 3 
  
 
³7KH\ZLOOQRWFRQWUROXV´In-group positivity and belief in intergroup conspiracies 
 They will not force us 
They will stop degrading us 
They will not control us 
We will be victorious 
Muse ³Uprising´ 
In mainstream superhero movies the evil-doer, conspiring to destroy the world, is 
often a demonic, disturbed individual. In real life, people seem to more often imagine evil 
groups rather than evil individuals behind major conspiracies. What we hear is: ³they are 
watching us,´ ³WKH\ are controlling us,´ and ³they are conspiring against us.´ Indeed, one of 
the defining features of a conspiracy is a belief in secret and malevolent actions of multiple 
actors (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; Kofta & 
6ĊGHN 2005; Zonis & Joseph, 1994). Thus, ³most conspiracy beliefs can be framed in terms 
of beliefs about how a powerful and evil out-group meets in secret, designing a plot that is 
harmful to RQH¶V in-group´ (van Prooijen and & Lange, 2014, pp. 238-239; emphasis added). 
To put it more broadly, conspiracy beliefs often presume an intergroup dimension.  
Studies on conspiracy mentality have identified an array of personal characteristics 
that are linked to belief in conspiracy theories. A conviction that others are secretly 
conspiring against us can serve as an external explanation for RQH¶V disadvantaged societal 
position or limited influence over his or her life. Indeed, research has demonstrated that 
conspiracy beliefs are associated with feelings of relative deprivation (Bilewicz, Winiewski, 
Kofta, & :yMFLN 2013), lack of personal control and powerlessness (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; 
Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011; Sullivan, Landau, & Rothchild, 2010; Van Prooijen & 
Jostmann, 2013; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), uncertainty (Whitson, Galinsky, & Kay, 2015), 
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low self-esteem (Swami et el., 2011;  Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999), as well as a lack of 
understanding of the socio-political reality (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Imhoff & Bruder, 
2014; Goertzel, 1994; Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010; Swami et al., 2011). 
Overall, conspiracy theories are linked to individual perceptions of a difficult and confusing 
reality.  
Given that conspiracy beliefs often assume actions of an out-group, it is reasonable to 
suspect that such beliefs should be linked not only to individual, but also group-level factors 
that determine intergroup attitudes. One robust determinant of intergroup relations is positive 
in-group identification (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Leach et al., 2008). It shapes how 
the in-group members act towards other members of their group as well as how they interact 
with members of other groups. Yet, little research has considered the relationship between 
positive in-group identification and the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories (van 
Prooijen & van Lange, 2014). The current research seeks to fill in this gap by examining the 
role various forms of positive regard for the in-group may play in predicting conspiracy 
beliefs.  
We propose that just as conspiracy beliefs seem to be related to the needs to manage 
feelings of individual powerlessness and uncertainty, adopting a belief that others are 
conspiring against the in-group might be related to the need to manage an undermined in-
group image. Preliminary evidence suggests that this indeed may be the case. Conspiracy 
beliefs are more prevalent among members of societally disadvantaged groups (Abalkina-
Paap et al., 1999; Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999; Goertzel, 1994). For 
example, in a study conducted by Crocker and colleagues (1999), Black Americans were 
more likely to believe in U.S. government conspiracies against Blacks than White Americans. 
This is probably not surprising given that disadvantaged groups often have objective reasons 
to believe that powerful groups act against them. As history has shown, paranoid convictions 
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about out-group conspiracies sometimes turn out to be valid. However, conspiracy theories 
often exaggerate the evil intentions and effectiveness of the conspiring enemy (e.g., Kramer 
& Messick, 1998; Kramer & Schaffer, 2004).  Exaggerated or not, among Blacks beliefs in 
the conspiracy theories were linked to higher racial self-esteem (although this effect was 
marginally significant; Crocker et al., 1999). Simmons and Parsons (2005) further 
demonstrated that such beliefs were associated with feelings of group (rather than individual) 
deprivation. Beliefs about out-group conspiracies have also been linked to victimhood-based 
social identity. For example, in a study conducted in Poland, Bilewicz and colleagues (2013) 
demonstrated that a conviction that in the past Poles have been victimized more than other 
nations was positively correlated with the endorsement of the conspiracy stereotype of Jews: 
the belief that Jews are a deceptive enemy who secretly conspires to overpower other groups 
(Kofta & 6ĊGHN 2005). These results suggest that conspiratorial explanations of intergroup 
interactions may thrive when the in-group is seen as particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable 
(see also Kramer & Schaffer, 2014; van Prooijen & van Lange, 2014).  
Such vulnerability of positive in-group identity is captured by the concept of 
collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009). 
Collective narcissism is a form of in-group positivity that reflects a belief in the in-group¶s 
greatness associated with a conviction that others do not appreciate the in-group enough. 
Collective narcissism is associated with defensive intergroup hostility and sensitivity to 
threats to the in-group¶V image. Research demonstrates that collective narcissism predicts 
hostile responses to criticism or lack of special recognition, which serve to punish the 
offending out-group and restore the in-JURXS¶V image (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-
Golec, 2013). According to collective narcissistic logic, there is rarely anything wrong with 
the in-group and any criticism aims to undermine and threaten in-JURXS¶V image which needs 
to be protected. In a similar vein, a belief that other groups are conspiring against the in-
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group could serve as an external explanation for why the in-group does not always succeed as 
it should, and does not always receive the outcomes or recognition it deserves. In fact, 
perceiving the in-group as a victim of vicious external attacks serves to glorify the in-group 
in its unprecedented martyrdom (6NDUĪ\ĔVND 3U]\E\áD & :yMFLN, 2012). In such cases, the 
evil intentions of others are likely to be exaggerated in order to match and validate the 
greatness of the suffering in-group. 
As a form of positive in-group regard contingent on external validation, collective 
narcissism is linked to increased sensitivity to signs of threats to the in-JURXS¶V image from 
out-groups. Even ambiguous intergroup situations are perceived as threatening and past 
intergroup wrongdoings are rarely forgiven or forgotten (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). 
Rumination over past intergroup interactions and hypervigilance in processing information 
about out-group intentions have important consequences for interpreting intergroup behavior: 
they can foster perceptions of out-group actions as specifically directed at in-group members, 
and as malevolent in their intentions (Kramer & Schaffer, 2014). These processes can also 
overall foster convictions about out-group conspiracies and they can be exacerbated by 
perceptions of threat (Kramer & Schaffer, 2014).  
In a similar vein, previous research has demonstrated that feelings of threat can foster 
beliefs in intergroup conspiracies. For example, in a study conducted by Kofta, SĊdek, & 
Sáawuta (2011) threatening the in-group image by reminders of past crimes increased the 
endorsement of conspiracy stereotypes of out-groups. Similarly, research conducted in 
Indonesia demonstrated that intergroup threat amplifies the positive effects of chronic (as 
well as temporarily salient) Muslim identification on conspiracy beliefs about Westerners 
instigating terrorism in Indonesia (Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2013). Because collective narcissism 
is a robust predictor of intergroup threat sensitivity, there are reasons to expect that collective 
narcissism should predict belief in the conspiratorial intentions of out-group members. 
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Initial evidence suggests that collective narcissism is linked to the conspiracy 
mentality. In a study conducted in Poland, national collective narcissism predicted 
endorsement of conspiracy stereotypes of Jews, which further predicted general anti-
Semitism (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012). In the present research we examine whether 
collective narcissism is a robust predictor of conspiracies beliefs outside of the specific 
context of the Polish-Jewish relations. We expect that collective narcissism should be related 
to the endorsement of beliefs about the conspiratorial actions of out-groups. However, there 
are many conspiracy theories that focus on the actions of some representatives of the in-
group. For instance, country officials are often accused of hiding uncomfortable facts from 
the society. Notable examples of such conspiracy theories include beliefs about involvement 
of the US government in the 9/11 attack or the English Royal Family in the death of Princes 
Diana (see, e.g., Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012). Hence, in addition we hypothesized that 
although collective narcissism might overall motivate seeing conspiracies almost anywhere, 
the concern with in-group image and a need to believe in its greatness would suppress the 
endorsement of conspiracies that might point to actions of the in-group.  
Nevertheless, we do not assume that positive regard for the in-group always breeds 
intergroup paranoia and conspiracy beliefs. Just as not all individuals with high self-esteem 
are narcissists, not all high identifiers develop narcissistic attachment to the in-group. In fact, 
it is possible to nurture a secure, non-narcissistic form of in-group positivity (Golec de 
Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). Non-narcissistic in-group positivity can be captured by 
co-varying out the variance associated with collective narcissism from measures of in-group 
positivity, which encompass satisfaction with in-group membership, emotional attachment to 
other in-group members as well as importance of the in-group to the self (such a combination 
of factors reflects a group-level self-investment, Leach et al., 2008, and is considered the core 
of in-group identification, Postmes, Haslam, & Jans, 2013; Tajfel, 1978). Non-narcissistic in-
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group positivity presumes a more objective (rather than grandiose) and secure (rather than 
defensive and dependent) perception of the in-group. Research shows that such positive yet 
secure regard for the in-group predicts greater tolerance of out-groups (Golec de Zavala, 
Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). Because non-narcissistic in-group positivity is not contingent 
on external recognition it is less likely to predict preoccupation with intergroup threats or the 
necessity to validate the in-JURXS¶V greatness.  We then expect non-narcissistic in-group 
positivity to predict less preoccupation with conspiracy theories, regardless of these theories¶ 
attribution of conspiratorial actions to the in-group or the out-group. 
Overview of the current research 
The aim of this research is to examine the role of different types of in-group positivity 
in inspiring conspiracy beliefs in the intergroup context. Specifically, we propose that the link 
between in-group positivity and belief in intergroup conspiracies will depend on the type of 
positivity. We hypothesize that collective narcissism will predict out-group (but not in-group) 
conspiracy beliefs. Non-narcissistic in-group positivity, on the other hand, should predict a 
lower likelihood of endorsing conspiracy theories, regardless of these conspiracies being 
ascribed to in-group or out-group members. We validate our predictions in three studies, 
conducted in two different cultural and political contexts: Poland (Studies 1 and 2) and the 
US (Study 3). In all studies, we measured collective narcissism with the Collective 
Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). In order to examine the robustness of the 
expected effect, in each study we use different operationalizations of in-group positivity: 
collective self-esteem measured with Luhtanen & &URFNHU¶V 1992 scale used with respect to 
the in-group (Study 1), in-group identification measured with &DPHURQ¶V 2004 scale (Study 
2) and the group-level self-investment component of social identification measured with 
/HDFK¶V 2008 scale (Study 3). All of these scales capture in-group positivity conceptualized 
as the emotional investment of the self in the group which combines feeling like a group 
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member, satisfaction with the in-group membership and solidarity and connection to other 
members of the in-group (Cameron, 2004; Postmes, Haslam, & Jans, 2012; Tajfel, 1978).  
In Study 1 we examine whether the likelihood of endorsing conspiratorial 
explanations for the lack of in-group recognition is positively predicted by collective 
narcissism but negatively by non-narcissistic in-group positivity. In Study 2 we examine 
whether collective narcissism and non-narcissistic in-group positivity have opposite effects 
on beliefs in out-group conspiracies, even when accounting for generalized prejudice towards 
the out-group. We also test whether these effects are mediated by perceptions of threat. 
Finally, in Study 3 we again measure collective narcissism and non-narcissistic in-group 
positivity, and implement an experimental design in order to compare their effects on beliefs 
about conspiracies implicating out-group versus in-group members.  
Study 1 
 In Study 1 we sought to establish the basic relationships between collective 
narcissism, in-group positivity and the endorsement of conspiratorial explanations for 
intergroup events. We used data from a larger study conducted in Poland in the context of 
commemorations of the fall of the Communist regime in the Eastern Europe. Poles tend to 
take pride in the role they played in the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Lewicka, 2014). The events that led to the system change begun with the Solidarity 
movement, which became active in Poland in the 1980s and eventually led to the (partially) 
free elections of June 4th 1989. For many Poles it is this Election Day that marks the fall of 
the Communist regime. Nevertheless, for many other people the later Fall of the Berlin Wall 
on November 9th 1989 became the symbol of the end of the Communism. 
We hypothesized that collective narcissism would predict perceiving the fact that 
Berlin Wall is a more renowned symbol of the fall of Communism than the Polish free 
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elections (or the Round Table negotiations that led to them) as a result of conspiratorial 
actions of other nations. Moreover, in line with previous research (Golec de Zavala, 
Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013), we predicted that when collective narcissism is accounted for, 
we would be able to observe the effects of non-narcissistic in-group positivity, which should 
predict more positive responses to the situation. In other words, we hypothesized that, when 
allowed to co-vary, collective narcissism and non-narcissistic in-group positivity will have 
opposite effects on conspiracy beliefs: collective narcissism would predict increased 
conspiracy beliefs, while non-narcissistic in-group positivity would predict decreased 
conspiracy beliefs.   
Method 
Participants. 
Study 1 was conducted among 97 Polish students. We excluded data from one 
participant who reported her nationality as Ukrainian. The final sample included 96 
participants of Polish nationality. The age of the participants ranged from 18 to 29 years (M= 
21.64, SD= 1.99)1. There were 16 male and 80 female participants. 
Procedure. 
Participants were asked to fill out measures of collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala 
et al., 2009) and in-group positivity (operationalized as collective self-esteem; Luhtanen & 
Crocker, 1992) with respect to the national in-group. All participants were exposed to a text 
discussing the alleged lack of acknowledgement for Polish achievements in the context of the 
fall of Communism (for full text see the Supporting Information). Afterwards, participants 
were asked about various explanations of this situation, which included questions about a 
                                                          
1
 Unless stated otherwise, across all studies the pattern of results of the regression analyses 
remains the same when we include demographics as covariates (age and gender in Studies 1 
and 2; age, gender, education, and ethnicity in Study 3).  
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possible anti-Polish conspiracy. Participants were asked to rate how probable it is that lack of 
recognition of Poles is a result of an international conspiracy aimed to undermine Polish 
achievements2.   
Measures. 
Collective narcissism was measured with the 9-item version of the national Collective 
Narcissism Scale (e.g., ³1RWPDQ\SHRSOHVHHPWRIXOO\XQGHUVWDQGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKH
3ROLVKQDWLRQ´, with a scale from 1= definitely disagree to 6= definitely agree (Golec de 
Zavala et al., 2009), Į= .89, M= 3.38, SD= 0.84. 
Collective self-esteem. In-group positivity was measured with the Collective Self-
Esteem Scale administered in relation to the national in-group (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). 
Participants were asked to respond to 16 items capturing in-JURXSPHPEHUVKLSHJ³I am a 
worthy member of WKH3ROLVKQDWLRQ´SULYDWHFROOHFWLYHVHOI-HVWHHPHJ³I often regret that 
I belong to the Polish nation,´UHYHUVHFRGHGSXEOLFFROOHFWLYHVHOI-esteem (e.g., ³Overall, 
the Polish nation is considered good by others.´, and importance of in-group identity (e.g., 
                                                          
2
 This study also included a failed manipulation of deprivation of personal and collective 
control, originally for purposes of a different project. Because this manipulation did not 
significantly affect our variables of interest (all Fs < 1), we treat this data as a cross-sectional 
survey. Including the manipulation as a covariate does not affect the pattern of results. The 
study also included a measure of inclusion of in-group in the self (Tropp & Wright, 2001), 
which was not reliably associated with conspiracy beliefs, r (91)= .13, p= .23. Finally, we 
measured (1) blaming Poles themselves for the situation presented in the text and (2) 
perceptions of the text as inaccurate (both unrelated to collective narcissism or collective self-
esteem; ps > .10), as well as (3) experiences of lack of recognition in the context of fighting 
Communism and (4) anti-German prejudice (in regression analyses both variables positively 
predicted by collective narcissism and negatively by collective self-esteem; all ps < .01). 
When we include anti-German prejudice as a covariate, collective narcissism remains a 
positive predictor of conspiracies (B= 0.57, SE= 0.20, p= .004), while the effect for collective 
self-esteem becomes non-significant (B= -0.12, SE= 0.17, p = .49). Details of these analyses 
are available by request.  
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³Overall, being Polish has very little to do with how I feel about myself,´ reverse coded) on a 
scale from 1= definitely disagree to 7= definitely agree Į= .88, M= 4.40, SD= 0.89. 
Beliefs in anti-Polish conspiracy was measured with four items, e.g., ³7KHVWDWHRI
affairs discussed in the text is a consequence of a conspiracy aimed at undermining our input 
LQWKHILJKWIRUGHPRFUDF\´, ³:HVWHUQFRXQWULHVFRQVSLUHDJDLQVW3ROLVKSHRSOHDQG
LQWHQWLRQDOO\IDOVLI\WKHKLVWRU\´³6XFKSHUFHSWLRQVRIKLVWRU\DUHDUHVXOWRISXUSRVHIXO
DFWLRQVWKDWDLPWRVXSSRUW*HUPDQ\¶VGRPLQDQWSRVLWLRQ´³The state of affairs discussed in 
the text is a result of malignant anti-3ROLVKSURSDJDQGD´. Participants were asked to indicate 
their response on a scale from 1= definitely disagree to 7= definitely agree, Į= .86, M= 2.37, 
SD= 1.47. 
Results 
First, zero-order correlations between all variables were computed. Collective 
narcissism was significantly positively related to collective self-esteem, r(943)= .61, p < .001. 
Conspiracy beliefs were significantly positively correlated with collective narcissism, r(91)= 
.54, p < .001, and marginally positively associated with collective self-esteem, r(91)= .20, p= 
.061. To account for the variance shared between collective narcissism and collective self-
esteem, we examined both of these variables as predictors of belief in anti-Polish conspiracy. 
When both types of in-group positivity were included in the analyses the effect of collective 
self-esteem became significant and negative, B= -0.41, SE= 0.19, p= .034, while the effect of 
collective narcissism on beliefs in anti-Polish conspiracy remained significantly positive, B= 
1.19, SE= 0.19, p < .001; F (2, 90)= 21.43, R2= .32.   
                                                          
3
 Throughout the manuscript, any unaccounted for drops in degrees of freedom are due to 
missing data.  
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We used bootstrapping in PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) to test whether the negative effect 
of collective self-esteem on belief in conspiracies was suppressed by collective narcissism. 
We requested 50,000 bootstrap samples. The analysis confirmed a significant suppression 
effect of 0.73, with the 95% bootstrapped bias corrected confidence interval of 0.47 to 1.05. 
We ran a similar analysis to check whether the effect of collective narcissism was suppressed 
by collective self-esteem. Indeed, we found a significant suppression effect of -0.26, with the 
95% bootstrapped bias corrected confidence interval of -0.46 to -0.10, indicating that the 
significant effect of collective narcissism on conspiracy beliefs became stronger when 
collective self-esteem was accounted for.  
Discussion 
Study 1 confirmed that the belief in out-group conspiracies is differentially predicted 
by collective narcissism and non-narcissistic in-group positivity. Polish collective narcissism 
positively predicted a conviction that an international conspiracy is a reason why Poles did 
not receive proper acknowledgment for their contribution to the fight against Communism. 
Correlational analyses indicated that in-group positivity (here operationalized as collective 
self-esteem, Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) was positively, albeit marginally, associated with 
belief in conspiracies. However, when the overlap between in-group positivity and collective 
narcissism was accounted for, in-group positivity without the defensive component captured 
by collective narcissism, predicted lower likelihood of endorsing intergroup conspiracies, 
indicating a suppression effect. Overall, Study 1 provided initial confirmation for our 
hypotheses. One limitation of this study was that all participants were exposed to an excerpt 
that discussed the lack of recognition of in-group achievements, which might have prompted 
the need to find an explanation for what happened (e.g., in endorsing conspiracy theories). 
We address this limitation in Study 2. 
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Study 2 
Study 2 examined our hypotheses in a different intergroup context. We focused on the 
Smolensk catastrophe of 2010 that killed the Polish president, the first lady and almost one 
hundred government officials. Because the presidential plane crashed in Russia, on the 
sixtieth anniversary of the Russian massacre of Polish officers in Katyn, beliefs in Russian 
involvement in the Smolensk crash spread quickly after the tragedy. Conspiracy theories 
might have been one way of dealing with the trauma associated with the catastrophe. They 
might have helped attribute causes of the tragedy to negative out-group intentions and, thus, 
provide moral justification for finding an out-group to blame (Kofta & 6Ċdek, 2005). In the 
aftermath of the crash, we conducted a survey among Polish students, in which we 
investigated responses to the tragedy, including conspiracy theories about Russian 
involvement in the crash, attitudes towards Russians, and perceptions of threat. The survey 
also measured narcissistic and non-narcissistic regard for the national group, as well as 
political orientation.   
We hypothesized that belief in the Smolensk conspiracy would be positively predicted 
by collective narcissism and negatively by non-narcissistic in-group positivity. In addition, 
we tested whether these relationships would be mediated via perceptions of threat. We 
hypothesized that collective narcissism would be associated with increased perceptions of 
threat after the crash, which would at least to some extent account for increased conspiracy 
beliefs. Non-narcissistic in-group positivity, on the other hand, should be less sensitive to 
threat, and in turn less likely to foster the endorsement of conspiracy theories.  
In Study 2 we also aimed to rule out the possibility that the effects of collective 
narcissism on conspiracy beliefs can be explained by the fact that collective narcissism 
breeds general out-group hostility (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). Belief in 
out-group conspiracies can be a manifestation of a more generalized prejudice towards the 
RUNNING HEAD: In-group positivity and intergroup conspiracies                                 15 
  
out-group suspected for conspiring against the in-group. Previous research demonstrated that 
conspiracy stereotypes of Jews are a robust predictor of discrimination of Jews (e.g., Bilewicz 
et al., 2013; Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012.RIWD	6ĊGHN). Similarly and 
relevantly to the context of this study, prejudice towards Russians has been shown to be a 
predictor of belief in the Smolensk conspiracy (Grzesiak-Feldman & Haska, 2012). 
Therefore, in Study 2 we adjusted our analyses for out-group prejudice by including this 
variable as a covariate. In this way, we were able to test whether collective narcissism and 
non-narcissistic in-group positivity will predict belief in out-group conspiracies specifically, 
and over and above more general negative attitudes towards that group.  
We also sought to demonstrate that the effects of collective narcissism and non-
narcissistic in-group positivity on conspiracy beliefs would be observed even if we account 
for another variable typically associated with convictions about the Smolensk crash²
political orientation. Research indicates that generalized belief in conspiracy theories is 
linked to political extremism (van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet, 2015). However, in the 
context of the Smolensk crash there seems to be a clearer link between endorsement of a 
conservative, right-wing (rather than extremist) ideology and conspiracy beliefs (Pankowski, 
2012). This is likely due to the fact that the Polish president who died in the crash represented 
an ideologically conservative party (Law and Justice) and, hence, supporters of this party are 
those who most strongly believe in a conspiracy theory behind the crash (Pankowski, 2012). 
Therefore, we adjusted our analyses for political conservatism by including this variable as a 
covariate. 
Method 
Participants. 
Study 2 was conducted among 224 Polish students. We excluded data from one 
participant who reported her nationality as Ukrainian. The final sample included 223 Polish 
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participants. The age of participants ranged from 17 to 27 years (M= 21.82, SD= 1.77). There 
were 68 male and 155 female participants.   
Procedure. 
The study took place between April 12th and April 27th 2010 (i.e., in the weeks 
immediately following the plane crash), as part of a larger survey. Participants were asked to 
report their political orientation. Then, they were asked to fill out measures of collective 
narcissism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009) and in-group positivity (operationalized as in-group 
identification, Cameron, 2004) with respect to the national in-group, as well as perceptions of 
threat, attitudes towards Russians and beliefs in a Russian conspiracy behind the crash4.  
Measures. 
In-group identification with was measXUHGE\&DPHURQ¶VVFDOH. Participants 
were asked to respond to items capturing ties with other in-group members (e.g., ³,KDYHDORW
LQFRPPRQZLWKRWKHU3ROHV´), centrality of in-group identification (e.g., ³,RIWHQWKLQNDERXW
WKHIDFWWKDW,DP3ROLVK´DQG in-group affect HJ³,QJHQHUDO,¶PJODGWREH3ROLVK´on a 
scale from 1= definitely disagree to 5= definitely agree, Į= .91, M= 3.78, SD= 0.77. 
Collective narcissism was measured as in Study 1, Į= .88, M= 3.54, SD= 0.90. 
Perceived threat was measured with two items capturing responses to the Smolensk 
crash: ³,IHHO that the fate of the Polish nation is threatened.´³,IHHOWKUHDWHQHGZLWKZKDW
                                                          
4
 The survey also measured individual responses to the crash, own emotions and perceptions 
RI5XVVLDQV¶HPRWLRQVDQGDFWLRQVZKLFKZHUHQRWDQDO\VHGLQWKHFXUUHQWUHVHDUFK
Relevantly, it included measures of in-group glorification (positively correlated with 
conspiracy beliefs, r (182) = .22, p = .003) and attachment (not significantly correlated with 
conspiracy beliefs, r (182) = .02, p = .76; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006). Unfortunately, 
due to multicollinearity (indices of tolerance  .37) we were not able to conduct analyses 
accounting for the potential overlap between collective narcissism and glorification or in-
group identification and attachment. As in Study 1, we measured inclusion of in-group in the 
self, which was not reliably associated with conspiracy beliefs, r (182) = .002; p = .97. 
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happened.´on a scale from 1= definitely no to 7= definitely yes, r (217)= .49, M= 2.23, SD= 
1.42.  
Belief in Russian conspiracy was measured with three items: ³The catastrophe was 
PRVWOLNHO\DUHVXOWRI5XVVLD
VVHFUHWDFWLRQV´ ³:KDWKDSSHQHGLVDFRQVHTXHQFHRI5XVVLDQ
FRQVSLUDF\´ ³:KDWKDSSHQHGZDVSUREDEO\DQDFFLGHQW´ (reverse coded). Participants were 
asked to indicate their response on a scale from 1= definitely disagree to 7= definitely agree, 
with higher scores indicating a greater belief in conspiracy, Į= .81, M= 2.16, SD= 1.19.  
Anti-Russian attitudes. Two indices of prejudice were used. First, participants were 
asked to indicate their feelings towards Russians using six semantic differentials: cold ± 
warm, unfriendly ± friendly, trustful ± distrustful, positive ± negative, respect ± contempt, 
admiration ± disgust (see Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997), on a scale from 
1 to 7, with higher scores indicating greater negativity, Į= .91, M= 3.59, SD= 1.06. Second, 
participants were asked about their positive (e.g., cooperation, helping; reverse coded) and 
negative (e.g., avoidance, fighting) intentions towards Russians (see Mackie, Devos, & 
Smith, 2000). We asked them to indicate to what extent they would engage in a total of nine 
action tendencies on a scale from 1= definitely no to 7= definitely yes, Į= .81, M= 2.64, SD= 
0.91. These two indices were significantly positively correlated, r (176)= .58, p < .001, so we 
z-scored both variables and averaged them to create a general index of anti-Russian attitudes. 
Political conservatism. The survey included three items measuring ideological self-
placement in terms of general, social and economic issues (Cichocka & Jost, 2014). In the 
Polish context the social and economic dimensions tend to be separate, with the former being 
more relevant for differentiation between left and right wing individuals (Golec, 2001; 
Kossowska & van Hiel, 2003). Therefore, in the analyses we considered only general self-
placement LWHP³2QWKHVFDOHEHORZSOHDVHVWDWH\RXUSROLWLFDOYLHZV´WRZKLFKSDUWLFLSDQWV
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responded on a scale from 1= definitely left-wing to 7= definitely right-wing and self-
placement in terms of social issues: ³2QWKHVFDOHEHORZSOHDVHVWDWH\RXUSROLWLFDOYLHZV
ZLWKUHVSHFWWRVRFLDOLVVXHV´ to which participants responded on a scale from 1= definitely 
liberal to 7= definitely conservative as an index of political conservatism, r (221)= 0.49, p < 
.001, M= 3.74, SD= 1.30. 
Results 
First, correlations between all variables were computed (see Table 1). Collective 
narcissism was significantly positively related to in-group identification, threat, conspiracy 
beliefs and negativity against Russians. In-group identification, on the other hand, was not 
reliably associated with conspiracy beliefs or anti-Russians attitudes. Conspiracy beliefs were 
significantly positively correlated with perceived threat, political conservatism, as well as 
anti-Russians attitudes.  
---Table 1--- 
To further examine the relationship between the two types of in-group positivity and 
conspiracy beliefs, we ran a hierarchical regression analysis with conspiracy beliefs as the 
outcome variable, and two covariates: political orientation and prejudice. Model 1 included as 
predictors in-group identification and collective narcissism, while Model 2 added the two 
covariates (see Table 2).  
---Table 2--- 
When both types of in-group positivity were included in Model 1, the effect of 
collective narcissism on beliefs in Russian conspiracy remained significantly positive, B= 
0.45, SE= 0.11, p < .001, while the negative effect of non-narcissistic in-group identification 
became significant, B= -0.35, SE= 0.14, p = .01 (compared to zero-order correlations). We 
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used bootstrapping in PROCESS to test whether in-group identification and collective 
narcissism were mutual suppressors in predicting belief in conspiracies. We requested 50,000 
bootstrap samples in PROCESS. The analysis confirmed that indeed collective narcissism 
was suppressing the effects of in-group identification, point estimate= 0.32, with the 95% 
bootstrapped bias corrected confidence interval of 0.16 to 0.51. We also found that in-group 
identification was suppressing the effects of collective narcissism, point estimate= -0.16, with 
the 95% bootstrapped bias corrected confidence interval of -0.31 to -0.03, indicating that the 
significant effect of collective narcissism on conspiracy beliefs became stronger when in-
group identification was accounted for. 
In Model 2 the positive effect of collective narcissism and the negative effect of in-
group identification remained significant when we included general negativity towards 
Russians as well as political conservatism as covariates. The suppression effects remained 
significant when these variables were included as covariates of the indirect effect model.  
Finally, we considered perceived threat as a mediator of the effects of narcissistic and 
non-narcissistic in-group positivity on conspiracy beliefs. We tested a path model (Figure 1) 
using Mplus 7 0XWKpQ	0XWKpQ1998-2012)5. We used bootstrapping with 50,000 
resamples. The analyses included political conservatism and anti-Russian prejudice as 
covariates. As can be discerned from Figure 1, collective narcissism was positively associated 
with in-group identification, B= 0.39, SE= 0.05, p < .001. Collective narcissism positively 
predicted greater intergroup threat, B= 0.58, SE= 0.12, p < .001, but no longer significantly 
predicted belief in conspiracies, B= 0.13, SE= 0.12, p= .30. In line with our predictions, 
perception of threat mediated between collective narcissism and belief in Russian conspiracy, 
the indirect effect= 0.13, with the 95% bootstrapped bias corrected confidence interval of 
                                                          
5
 All independent variables were included in the model command. Mplus defaults were used 
for the estimator and treatment of missing data. 
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0.05 to 0.24. This effect remains significant without adjusting for prejudice and political 
orientation.  
In the model, when adjusting for collective narcissism, non-narcissistic in-group 
identification was a negative and significant predictor of intergroup threat, B= -0.32, SE= 
0.15, p= .03 and of belief in conspiracies, B= -0.32, SE= 0.15, p= .03. Perceptions of threat 
mediated between non-narcissistic in-group identification and belief in Russian conspiracy, 
the indirect effect= -0.07, 95% bias corrected bootstrapped confidence interval: -0.18 to -
0.01. However, this effect should be treated with caution as it was no longer significant when 
sex and age were included as covariates or when we did not include any covariates (i.e., 
without demographics, political orientation and prejudice). In both cases, this was due to the 
fact that the effect of non-narcissistic in-group identification on threat became non-
significant. 
---Figure 1--- 
Discussion 
While the Smolensk catastrophe was not associated with a direct threat from an out-
group, in Study 2 collective narcissism was associated with increased feelings of threat after 
the crash as well as with beliefs in Russian conspiracy behind this tragedy. Moreover, 
feelings of threat mediated between collective narcissism and conspiracy beliefs. These 
effects remained significant after adjusting for two important variables related to belief in 
conspiracies: political orientation and out-group prejudice. Therefore, the effects of collective 
narcissism on belief in conspiratorial actions of an out-group cannot be attributed to mere 
prejudice towards that group or a specific political stance.   
As in Study 1, in-group positivity (here operationalized as in-group identification, 
Cameron, 2004) alone was not significantly associated with conspiracy beliefs. However, 
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when we accounted for the defensive component of in-group positivity by adjusting for 
collective narcissism in the analysis, what became a non-narcissistic in-group positivity was 
associated with a decreased likelihood to believe in conspiracies and this effect was driven by 
overall decreased perceptions of threat (although the latter effect was only significant when 
generalized prejudice and conservatism were adjusted for).  
  Study 3 
Studies 1 and 2 corroborated our basic prediction about the opposite effects of 
collective narcissism and non-narcissistic in-group positivity on endorsing beliefs about out-
group conspiracies behind concrete events. This is in line with previous studies on conspiracy 
beliefs, which frequently focus on specific conspiracies, such as those concerning the death 
of Princes Diana (Douglas & Sutton, 2008) or 9/11 (Swami, et al., 2010; Wood & Douglas, 
2013). While specific events likely trigger the emergence of conspiracy theories about out-
group activities, it is also possible to imagine that collective narcissism would be linked to a 
more general tendency to believe in conspiratorial actions of out-groups, almost regardless of 
what those actions entail. Indeed, previous research has been successful in measuring such 
generic conspiracist beliefs (Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013; Bruder, Haffke, Neave, 
Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013). Therefore, in Study 3 we sought to examine whether the 
effects of collective narcissism and non-narcissistic in-group positivity would replicate if we 
considered conspiracy mentality more broadly.  
Nevertheless, we assumed that the effects of the two types of in-group positivity on 
general conspiracies would depend on whether these conspiracy beliefs concerned the actions 
of out-groups versus those of in-group members. We hypothesized that collective narcissism 
would predict beliefs in conspiratorial actions of out-group members; however, due to their 
high regard for the in-group, they should less likely to believe in conspiratorial actions of 
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their in-group. Non-narcissistic in-group positivity, on the other hand, should be associated 
with lesser need to believe in conspiracies overall, that thus should be a negative predictor of 
any type of conspiracies, regardless of them involving the in-group or the out-group. To 
examine these assumptions, in Study 3 we measured narcissistic and non-narcissistic in-group 
positivity with respect to the national group as well as the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs, 
and we manipulated whether these conspiracies implied malevolent actions of own versus 
foreign governments.  
Method  
Participants.  
Study 3 was conducted among 433 Mturk workers. We excluded data from 
participants who failed to report nationality or reported their national identity as other than 
American or mixed American (N= 92). The final sample consisted of 341 participants, 152 
women and 189 men, aged 18-73 (M= 31.92, SD= 10.57).  
Procedure.  
First, we asked participants to fill in the measures of national collective narcissism 
(Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013) and in-group positivity (operationalized as 
group-level self-investment, Leach et al, 2008). Then, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two experimental conditions: thinking about in-group versus out-group conspiracies. 
In the in-group condition (N= 168WKH\DQVZHUHGTXHVWLRQVDERXWEHOLHILQ86JRYHUQPHQW¶V
conspiracies. In the out-group condition (N= 173) they answered the same questions about 
EHOLHILQIRUHLJQJRYHUQPHQWV¶FRQVSLUDFLHV6.  
                                                          
6
 After the manipulation, we also measured system justification (Kay & Jost, 2003), 
perceptions of government representativeness and similarity to typical Americans, and 
feelings of control. 
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Measures. 
Collective narcissism was measured with the shorter, 5-item version of the Collective 
Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). Participants were asked to 
indicate how much they agree with the items referring to American identity using a scale 
from 1= I strongly disagree to 6= I strongly agree, Į= .89, M= 2.59, SD= 1.13. 
Group-level self-investment. WHXVHGWKH/HDFKDQGFROOHDJXHV¶VRFLDO
identification scale. Participants were asked to respond the items referring to American 
identity on a scale ranging from 1= I strongly disagree to 7= I strongly agree. We 
operationalized in-group positivity as the group-level self-investment dimension of social 
identification, which encompasses satisfaction with the in-group (e.g., ³I am glad to be 
American.´), solidarity with in-group members (e.g., ³I feel solidarity with Americans´, as 
well as centrality of the in-group to the self (e.g., ³Being American is an important part of 
how I see myself.´10 items, Į= .95, M= 4.92, SD= 1.32. This dimension of in-group 
positivity corresponds to the components of in-group identification also measured by 
&DPHURQ¶Vscale, which capture the emotional investment of the self in the group (see 
Postmes et al., 2012). 
The scale also includes a group-level self-definition dimension, 4 items, Į= .89, M= 
4.28, SD= 1.33), which reflects defining oneself through group membership HJ³I have a 
lot in common with the average American person.´and through similarities with other group 
members (e.g., ³I am similar to the average American person.´. This dimension reflects the 
process of social categorization which allows for defining the self as part of the group 
(Turner, 1982).  
Conspiracy beliefs were measured with 11 items based on the Generic Conspiracist 
Beliefs Scale (Brotherton et al., 2013). Participants first read instructions indicating that they 
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will rate statements in relation to the American government (in-group condition) or foreign 
governments (out-group condition) on a scale from 1= definitely not true to 5= definitely true. 
0RVWVWDWHPHQWVDGGLWLRQDOO\PDQLSXODWHGWKHVXEMHFWRIWKHFRQVSLUDF\HJ³)RUHLJQ
governments [the American government] deliberately conceal a lot of important information 
from the world public out of self-LQWHUHVW´Į= .89, M= 2.93, SD= 0.77. 
Results 
Collective narcissism and group-level self-investment were significantly positively 
correlated, r(339)= .60, p < .001. Conspiracy beliefs were positively although not 
significantly correlated with collective narcissism, r(339)= .05, p= .35, and marginally 
significantly and negatively correlated with group-level self-investment, r(339)= -.10, p= .06. 
We conducted a regression analysis, in which we examined the effects of collective 
narcissism and group-level self-investment on conspiracy beliefs, accounting for the overlap 
between these two forms of in-group positivity. We also investigated whether their effects 
depend on the subject of conspiracy theories (in-group versus out-group). All continuous 
variables were mean-centered prior to the analyses. Experimental conditions were coded as -
1= in-group and 1= out-group conspiracy beliefs.   
In the first step we tested the main effects of the experimental condition, collective 
narcissism and group-level self-investment on conspiracy beliefs. The model was significant, 
F(3, 337)= 4.09, p= .01, R2= .04. We found no significant effect of experimental condition on 
conspiracy beliefs, B= 0.05, SE= 0.04, p= .20. However, the results revealed a significant 
negative effect of group-level self-investment, B= -0.12, SE= 0.04, p= .002, and a significant 
positive effect of collective narcissism, B= 0.12, SE= 0.05, p= .01, on conspiracy beliefs.  
---Table 3--- 
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In the second step we introduced two-way interactions of the experimental condition 
with: (1) group-level self-investment and (2) collective narcissism (Table 3). The interaction 
of group-level self-investment and experimental condition was not significant, B= -0.02, SE= 
0.04, p= .697, while the effect of collective narcissism was qualified by the significant 
interaction of collective narcissism with the experimental condition (Figure 2), B= 0.11, SE= 
0.05, p= .01; for the whole model F(5, 335)= 4.07, p= .001, R2= .06, ǻR2= .02. Simple slopes 
analysis indicated that collective narcissism significantly predicted conspiracy beliefs in the 
out-group conspiracies condition, B= 0.22, SE= 0.06, p < .001, but not in the in-group 
conspiracies condition, B= -0.01, SE= 0.07, p= .918. 
When we used group-level self-definition in the analyses instead of group-level self-
investment, neither the main effect of self-definition, B= -0.02, SE= 0.04, p= .51, nor its 
interaction with the experimental condition were statistically significant, B= -0.02, SE= 0.04, 
p= .66 (although the interaction of collective narcissism and the experimental condition 
remained significant; B= 0.13, SE= 0.05, p= .01).   
---Figure 2--- 
As in Studies 1 and 2 we again tested whether group-level self-investment and 
collective narcissism were mutual suppressors in predicting conspiracy beliefs (including the 
experimental condition as a covariate). We requested 50,000 bootstrap samples in PROCESS. 
The analysis confirmed a significant effect of collective narcissism suppressing the effects of 
group-level self-investment, point estimate= 0.06, with the 95% bootstrapped bias corrected 
                                                          
7
 When we used the whole social identification scale (Į= .95, M= 4.67, SD= 1.19), results 
remain similar to those obtained for group-level self-investment only. 
8
 We considered the possibility that this effect might further depend on whether the 
government is perceived as legitimate or representative of the in-group. None of these 
variables moderated the effects. Results of these analyses are presented in the Supporting 
Information. 
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confidence interval of 0.01 to 0.11. We also tested whether the effect of collective narcissism 
on belief in conspiracies was suppressed by group-level self-investment. The analysis 
confirmed a significant suppression effect of -0.09, with the 95% bootstrapped bias corrected 
confidence interval of -0.15 to -0.03. 
Discussion 
Study 3 corroborated the results of Studies 1 and 2 by showing that collective 
narcissism and non-narcissistic in-group positivity have opposite relationships with the 
endorsement of conspiracy theories. The effect of collective narcissism was, however, 
dependent on whether these theories concerned the in-group or the out-group. Collective 
narcissism was positively associated with belief in out-group conspiracies but negatively, yet 
not-significantly, with belief in in-group conspiracies. It then seems that collective narcissism 
is related to seeing malevolent intentions mostly outside the own-group. On the other hand, 
in-group positivity, here operationalized as group-level self-investment (Leach et al., 2008) 
was marginally significantly negatively related to belief in both in-group and out-group 
conspiracies, and this effect became stronger and significant when the variance shared 
between in-group positivity and collective narcissism was partialled out (as indicated by the 
significant suppression effect). Importantly, Study 3 examined the effects on general 
conspiracy beliefs rather than conspiratorial explanations for certain events (such as the lack 
of recognition). This suggests that collective narcissism and non-narcissistic in-group 
positivity do not only predict endorsement of conspiracies as explanations of specific events, 
but they are also linked to a more general propensity to believe in conspiracy theories.   
General Discussion 
 In a series of three studies, conducted in two different social and political contexts, we 
have examined how the various ways people form attachment to their social groups predicts 
RUNNING HEAD: In-group positivity and intergroup conspiracies                                 27 
  
beliefs in conspiracy theories about actions of members of their own and other groups. 
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that collective narcissism, a defensive form of in-group 
positivity (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013), 
predicts the endorsement of conspiratorial explanations for events that are potentially 
threatening to the in-group. Study 2 further indicated that collective narcissism is linked to 
beliefs in conspiracy theories due to increased sensitivity to threat. Study 3 showed that 
collective narcissism predicts endorsement of conspiracy theories more broadly, but only if 
they implicate members of other groups (such as foreign governments). 
Collective narcissism was, however, unrelated to the endorsement of conspiracies that 
assume involvement of members of their in-group (such as members of their own 
government). Although collective narcissists might be generally prone to suspicion and 
perceptions of conspiracies, because they are concerned with protecting a positive image of 
the in-group, they might be motivated to reject views that might denigrate the in-group in 
some way (e.g., by accusing the own government of conspiring against its citizens). Thus, in 
the case of in-group conspiracy two tendencies related to collective narcissism are likely to 
drive the relationship in opposite directions: collective narcissism should predict the need to 
maintain positive in-group image, which could cancel the more general motivation to endorse 
group based conspiracy theories. This could result in an overall weak and non-significant 
effect. Nevertheless, it is at least plausible that collective narcissism emerges as a negative 
predictor of beliefs in own group conspiracies in certain situations, for example when the in-
group image is at stake and the motivation to protect it becomes especially strong. 
These possibilities notwithstanding, Study 3 demonstrated differences in 
psychological factors associated with different types of conspiracies. Collective narcissism 
predicted endorsement of conspiracy theories only when they were attributed to actions of 
foreign governments. This result challenges the assumption that all types of conspiracy 
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theories form a monological belief system (Goertzel, 1994) that should be predicted by 
similar psychological predispositions (see Sutton & Douglas, 2014 for a discussion). Rather, 
it seems that certain conspiracy theories (in this case those related to actions of out-group 
members) are uniquely predicted by a specific psychological construct (in this case collective 
narcissism).  
 Our results also show that strong positive regard for the in-group does not always 
have to assume susceptibility for believing in conspiracies. All three studies included 
measures of positive regard for the national in-group: operationalized in Study 1 as collective 
self-esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992); in Study 2 as in-group identification, (Cameron, 
2004), and in Study 3 as group-level self-investment (Leach et al., 2008), all of which capture 
the investment of the self in the group (Postmes et al., 2012; Tajfel, 1978). When the overlap 
between collective narcissism and in-group positivity was not accounted for, the relationships 
between in-group positivity and conspiracy beliefs were not consistent: positive and 
marginally significant in Study 1, negative and non-significant in Study 2, and negative and 
marginally significant in Study 3.  
However, when we partialled out collective narcissism, in all studies in-group 
positivity without the narcissistic component emerged consistently as a negative predictor of 
conspiracy beliefs. This effect emerged consistently regardless of how in-group positivity 
was operationalized and it is likely that it would generalize also to other measures of in-group 
positivity (see Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013).  Thus, accounting for the 
overlap between collective narcissism and in-group positivity allows us to uncover that non-
narcissistic in-group positivity assures more benevolent perceptions of out-JURXSV¶DFWLRQV
and intentions. In Studies 1 and 2, non-narcissistic in-group positivity was linked to lower 
endorsement of conspiratorial explanations for important events. In Study 2, this effect was 
driven by lower feelings of threat. Similarly, in Study 3 non-narcissistic in-group positivity 
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was associated with decreased belief in generalized conspiracy theories, regardless of these 
theories assuming involvement of own versus other governments. Presumably, non-
narcissistic in-group positivity predicts more open and trusting attitudes towards members of 
other groups (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013), which might lower the 
likelihood of developing suspicions about their actions. 
 Overall, these findings suggest that belief in intergroup conspiracies is not necessarily 
linked to identifying with the in-group that might be a target of secret actions of others. 
Rather, current research indicates that the conspiratorial mindset is linked only to certain 
ways in which in-group positivity can be construed. Conspiracy beliefs are more likely to 
arise when positive in-group identity is in some way threatened or undermined. Previous 
research by Mashuri and Zaduqisti (2013, 2014) showed that in-group identification predicts 
conspiracy beliefs in the context of situational threats. We demonstrate that conspiracy 
beliefs are robustly predicted by chronically threatened in-group positivity in the form of 
collective narcissism. One way of dealing with threatened in-group identity might be to 
blame potentially dishonest enemies for any misfortunes of the in-group. In this way feelings 
of threat can be attributed to actions of out-groups, which seek to undermine the in-group. If 
such actions are not immediately identifiable, they can always be presumed to operate in 
secrecy as part of a larger conspiracy.  
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Table 1 
Correlations between Collective Narcissism, In-group Identification, Perceived Threat, Belief 
in Conspiracies, Political Conservatism and Anti-Russian Attitudes (Study 2) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
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*p <  .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 2 
Collective narcissism, In-group Identification, Political Orientation and Anti-Russian 
Attitudes as Predictors of Conspiracy Beliefs (Study 2) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE B SE 
,QJURXSLGHQWLILFDWLRQ     
&ROOHFWLYHQDUFLVVLVP 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*p  < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 3 
Collective Narcissism and Group-level Self-investment as Predictors of In-group and Out-
group Conspiracy Beliefs (Study 3) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE B SE 
Condition (-1= in-group, 1= out-group) 
Collective narcissism 
Group-level self-investment 
Condition X Collective narcissism 
Condition X Group-level self-investment 
0.05 
0.12** 
-0.12** 
 
.04 
.05 
.04 
0.05 
0.11** 
-0.11** 
0.11* 
-0.02 
.04 
.05 
.04 
.05 
.04 
F 4.09** 4.07** 
R2 .04 .06 
ǻ5 - .02* 
*p <  .05. **p < .01. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Effects of collective narcissism and in-group identification on conspiracy beliefs 
via perceptions of threat (Study 2).  
Note.  *p < .05. ***p < .001. Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. Dotted line indicates a non-significant path. Paths for covariates (political 
conservatism and prejudice) are not presented in the model for simplicity. 
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Figure 2. Interaction effect of experimental condition and collective narcissism on conspiracy 
beliefs (Study 3).  
Note. *** p < .001. Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
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Supporting Information Study 1 
English translation of the text based on Tokarz (2009) presented to participants in Study 1: 
Not long ago Berlin held a grand ceremony to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of 
the fall of the wall, dividing once this great European city. Almost all world VIPs 
came to the German capital (...). The ceremony was also attended by Donald Tusk and 
Lech Walesa. The latter even started the fall of big dominoes (like once of 
Communism), symbolizing the Berlin Wall.  
Berlin celebratioQVFOHDUO\VKRZWKDW3ROHVµORVW¶ZLWK*HUPDQVWKHILJKWRYHU
the consciousness of Europeans, and the world. On our continent, the symbols of 
overthrowing Communism are neither the Gdansk Shipyard, nor the Round Table, 
and especially not the Polish elections of June 1989. What is obvious for Poles is not 
necessarily obvious for other nations. And although the name of the former leader of 
the striking workers, Nobel Prize winner and former Polish president, pronounced 
often "Walesa" is known not only in GermDQ\WKHUH¶VVWLOORQHELJ³EXW´,WLV
November 9th 1989 that became a symbol of transition in Eastern and Central Europe. 
Germans taught Poles a hard lesson on how important dates should be handled and 
FHOHEUDWHG7KH\VKRZHGWKHZRUOGWKDWWKH\µZRQ¶WKHIUHHGRPDQGWKDWWKH
Berlin events twenty years ago symbolize the fall of Communism (...).  
Supporting Information Study 3 
In Study 3 we considered the possibility that the effect of different types of in-group 
positivity on conspiracy beliefs might further depend on whether the government is perceived 
as legitimate or representative of the in-group. Specifically, we predicted that the 
endorsement of own government conspiracies might depend on whether the government is 
perceived as representing the in-group. Although collective narcissism was unrelated to 
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beliefs in own government conspiracies, we suspected this relationship might emerge for 
those who perceive the government as unrepresentative for the society²essentially as part of 
the out-group. Therefore, at the end of the study we measured perceptions of the government 
in order to verify the hypothesis that the relationship between collective narcissism and 
beliefs in own government conspiracies could be moderated by the extent to which the 
government is representative for the in-group. We also measured system justification (Kay & 
Jost, 2003) to see whether the current effects could be moderated by perceptions of general 
system legitimacy.  
Measures 
Perceptions of the government as unrepresentative were measured with two items. 
On a scale from 1 to 5 participants were asked to choose which of two sentences is more 
DFFXUDWH³7KH$PHULFDQJRYHUQPHQWUHSUHVHQWZHOOWKH$PHULFDQSHRSOH´YHUVXV³7KH
American government does not represeQWZHOOWKH$PHULFDQSHRSOH´³3HRSOHLQWKH
American government are similar to regular Americans´YHUVXV³3HRSOHLQWKH$PHULFDQ
government are very different from regular´7KHWZRLWHPVZHUHVLJQLILFDQWO\SRVLWLYHO\
correlated, r(339)= .59, p < .001, M= 3.58, SD= 1.02.  
System justification was measured with the general system justification scale (Kay & 
-RVW3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGWRDQVZHULWHPVVXFKDV³,QJHQHUDOWKH$PHULFDQ
political system operates DVLWVKRXOG´RQDVFDOHIURP= strongly disagree to 9= strongly 
agree, Į= .86, M= 4.56, SD= 1.52. 
Results and discussion 
Perceptions of the government as unrepresentative were significantly negatively 
correlated with system justification, r(339)= -.46, p < .001. Perceptions of the government as 
unrepresentative were significantly positively correlated with conspiracy beliefs, r(339)= .24, 
p < .001, and significantly negatively correlated both with collective narcissism, r(339)= -.20, 
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p < .001, and with group-level self-investment, r(339)= -.22, p < .001. System justification 
was significantly negatively correlated with conspiracy beliefs, r(339)= -.26, p < .001, and 
positively significantly correlated both with collective narcissism, r(339)= .48, p < .001, and 
group-level self-investment, r(339)= .56, p < .001. 
We then checked whether perceptions of the government as unrepresentative 
moderated the effects of collective narcissism, group-level self-investment and the 
experimental manipulation on conspiracy beliefs. To this end we conducted a hierarchical 
regression analysis. In the first step we tested the main effects of the four variables on 
conspiracy beliefs, F(4, 336)= 8.08, p < .001, R2= .09. The effect of perceptions of the 
government as unrepresentative was significant, B= 0.18, SE= 0.04, p < .001. The effect of 
the experimental condition remained non-significant, B= 0.05, SE= 0.04, p= .21, while the 
effects of group-level self-investment, B= -0.10, SE= 0.04, p= .01, and collective narcissism, 
B= 0.13, SE= 0.05, p= .003, remained significant. In the second step we introduced all 
possible two-way interactions of the four variables, F(10, 330)= 4.27, p < .001, R2= .11, ǻR2= 
.03. Only the crucial interaction between collective narcissism and the experimental condition 
was significant, B= 0.11, SE= 0.05, p= .02, while all other two-way interactions were not-
significant (all ps > .29).  As in the main results, with perceptions of the government as 
unrepresentative as a covariate, the effect of collective narcissism on conspiracy beliefs was 
significant in the in-group conspiracies condition, B= 0.23, SE= 0.06, p < .001, but not in the 
out-group conspiracies condition, B= 0.01, SE= 0.07, p= .92.  In the third step of our analyses 
we added two three way interactions, which were non-significant: (1) the interaction of the 
experimental condition, collective narcissism and perceptions of government 
unrepresentativeness, B= -0.04, SE= 0.04, p= .38, (2) the interaction of the experimental 
condition, group level self-investment and perceptions of government unrepresentativeness, 
B= 0.04, SE= 0.04, p= .23; F(12, 328)= 3.67, p < .001, R2= .12, ǻR2= .004. These results 
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indicate that perceptions of the current government as unrepresentative did not significantly 
moderate the effects of the two types of in-group positivity on endorsement of own versus 
other government conspiracies. 
 We also considered the possibility that the effects could be moderated by the level of 
system justification. Therefore, we performed a similar set of analyses using system 
justification (rather than perceptions of the government as unrepresentative) as the moderator. 
In the first step we tested the main effects of the four variables on conspiracy beliefs, F(4, 
336)= 10.41, p < .001, R2= .11. The effect of system justification was negative and 
significant, B= -0.17, SE= 0.03, p < .001. The effect of experimental condition was non-
significant, B= 0.04, SE= 0.04, p= .30, the effect of collective narcissism was significant, B= 
0.17, SE= 0.05, p < .001. However, when system justification was included in the model, the 
effect of group-level self-investment was not significant, B= -0.04, SE= 0.04, p = .37, 
possibly due to a relatively strong correlation between system justification and group-level 
self-investment. In the second step we introduced all possible two-way interactions of the 
four variables, F(10, 330)= 4.94, p < .001, R2= .13, ǻR2= .02. Only the crucial interaction 
between collective narcissism and the experimental condition was significant, B= 0.10, SE= 
0.05, p= .03, while all other two-way interactions were not-significant (all ps > .43).  As in 
the main results, with system justification as a covariate, the effect of collective narcissism on 
conspiracy beliefs was significant in the in-group conspiracies condition, B= 0.26, SE= 0.06, 
p < .001, but not in the out-group conspiracies condition, B= 0.05, SE= 0.07, p= .48.  
In the third step of our analyses we added two three way interactions, which resulted 
to be non-significant: (1) the interaction of the experimental condition, collective narcissism 
and system justification, B = 0.004, SE = 0.03, p = .89, and (2) the interaction of the 
experimental condition, group level self-investment and system justification, B= 0.002, SE= 
0.02, p= .93; F(12, 328)= 4.10, p < .001, R2= .13, ǻR2= .0002. These results indicate that 
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system justification did not significantly moderate the effects of the two types of in-group 
positivity on endorsement of own versus other government conspiracies. 
Overall, these analyses did not indicate that the effects of different types of in-group 
positivity depend on perceptions of government representativeness or legitimacy. However, it 
is possible that these relationships depend on other factors, such as political convictions or 
the broader cultural and political context. For example, critical approach to RQH¶Vown 
government might be more acceptable in contexts where political trust is generally lower than 
in the US (e.g., post-Communist countries; Mason, 1995). These possibilities await future 
empirical verification.  
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